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Everyday disasters, stagnation and the normalcy of non-development:
Roghun Dam, a ﬂood, and campaigns of forced taxation in southern
Tajikistan
Diana Ibañez-Tirado*
School of Global Studies (Anthropology), University of Sussex, Brighton, UK; Centre of Contemporary
Central Asia and the Caucasus, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, SOAS, University of
London, UK.
This article conducts a comparative analysis of a catastrophic ﬂood that hit the Kulob region of
southern Tajikistan in 2010, and the government of Tajikistan’s campaign to gather money to
build the Roghun dam and hydropower station. It advances the notion of ‘everyday disasters’ in
order to explain the imprecise boundaries between major catastrophic events and more
mundane dimensions of the everyday as experienced by residents of Kulob. The article
seeks to shed light, ﬁrstly, on the processes that underpin both Kulob residents’ experiences
of stagnation and the normalization of non-development, and, secondly, on the ways in
which Kulob residents joke and ‘do’ cunning/cheating whilst dealing with disastrous events
in order to cultivate an everydayness that is worth living.
Keywords: disaster; event; everyday life; joking; cunning; Roghun; Tajikistan
The ﬂood: an introduction
The sound of heavy rain and thunder made it difﬁcult to sleep, the night of 6May 2010 in Kulob, a
city of multi-storey Soviet-era buildings and detached houses 200 km south of Dushanbe, Tajiki-
stan’s capital. Mijgona, a woman in her mid-thirties who had invited me to spend the night in her
house, woke up and noticed that her husband, Mahmud, was not in their room. After waiting for
half an hour for Mahmud to return from the outdoor lavatory, she got up to search for him in the
house’s vegetable garden. In the dark, she did not notice the ﬂow of water invading the garden,
ﬂooding the henhouses and submerging the corpses of drowned chickens and partridges. As
Mijgona stepped into the mud, she was suddenly dragged downstream several metres, eventually
collapsing against the garden’s wall. Earlier that night, her husband had also been dragged away
by the water. That night, I had heard the noise of water ﬂowing outside the house, but not risen
from my sleep. In the morning, I found Mijgona and Mahmud both bruised and obviously upset
that they had lost most of their crops and poultry. They also laughed loudly about the reason
Mijgona had gone to look for her husband in the middle of the night: fearing the worst,
Mijgona had walked to the garden convinced that her beloved Mahmud was secretly meeting
another woman. When we stopped laughing at their jokes about Mijgona’s jealousy, we con-
cluded that we had been lucky. The house in which they hosted me, and that was located on
high ground at the edge of the city, was standing. In contrast, the oldest neighbourhood of
Kulob city, Charamgaro Poyon (mainly made up of detached houses), had been destroyed, and
many people had perished there.
The next day, when water levels in Charamgaro ﬁnally abated, many residents started to re-
enter their former neighbourhood to search for the places where their houses had once stood. With
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tears in her eyes, Moma Farzona, an elderly woman who was an acquaintance of my host family
in Kulob, explained to me:
Our house was just in front of the bridge – but you see? There is no bridge anymore!…We saw water
and a mess coming and we ran to the roof. Everything was water, water, but it was confusing – every-
thing was dark.… In the morning we came down. We were frozen and scared. In the door of this room
[pointing with her ﬁnger] the neighbour’s boy was found. They didn’t manage to hold his hand or –
God knows! But the boy came with the water, mud and rocks and ended up here. Half of his body was
trapped under the rocks. We called the neighbours. They came and we told them not to be scared.
Nobody knew how to tell them. They saw him. It was hard to pull his body out – oh my God!
They pulled him out while removing some heavy boulders. Of course he was dead – dead – inside
him all water – oh my God!
There were many stories similar to Moma Farzona’s. Days later people in Kulob started to
speak about how many of their relatives were in hospital with broken bones; others were said
to have been so deeply affected by the events that they had ‘gone mad’ (devona shudan).1 Accord-
ing to the data released by Tajikistan’s government, the ﬂood hit Kulob and several villages in
Tajikistan’s eastern Khatlon region, resulting in 22 deaths, 55 missing, 200 injured, and 4000 dis-
placed. In the days immediately following the ﬂood, however, the affected people who had gath-
ered in tents in the emergency camp calculated amongst themselves that over 1000 people were
dead and many hundreds more missing. According to them, the authorities had refused to make
this data public. My informants also told me that, following the ‘path of Islam’, most people who
lost relatives in the ﬂood hurried to bury the bodies of the victims. One informant, whose brother
and nephew had drowned, explained to me that the ofﬁcial and bureaucratic procedure required to
register a death was too long and, in such circumstances, the process would have surely taken a
very long time. Others told me that some people had decided not to register the deaths of relatives
so that, in an act of cunning/cheating (cholok; zirak; ﬁreb kardan), they could continue to receive
the deceased’s pensions.
This article is based on 16 months of anthropological ﬁeldwork conducted between 2009 and
2013 in the city of Kulob and several surrounding villages in the Khatlon region of southern Taji-
kistan.2 This region is better known as the homeland of Tajikistan’s political elite and the coun-
try’s president, Emomali Rahmon (he is from Danghara, a district within Khatlon), who came to
power in 1992 and consolidated his position by ﬁghting opposition forces during the bloody civil
war that afﬂicted Tajikistan until 1997. Since Kulob itself was not the scene of major ﬁghting
between the rival factions during the hostilities, the city ﬂourished in the national media as a
symbol of government authority. During my ﬁeldwork, however, most Kulob residents identiﬁed
themselves as ‘ordinary’ (oddi) in order to disconnect themselves from Tajikistan’s political elites:
my informants and acquaintances explained to me that contrary to what many Tajiks from other
regions say, Kulob residents have not beneﬁted from the outcome of the civil war. Rather, they
often highlighted that Kulob lost its previous administrative role as the region’s capital (which
was moved to the city of Qurghon-Teppa) and that many factories from the Soviet era (e.g.
food, oil and cotton processing plants) had been shut down, leaving many workers unemployed.
Kulob residents’ socio-economic positions, education, and backgrounds are of course internally
differentiated. Yet most of my informants were united by a number of common characteristics:
they shared their homes with extended and itinerant families (with members travelling back
and forth to, and sending remittances from, Dushanbe and/or Russia); earned irregular incomes
(even though some, like teachers and nurses, worked in stable government positions); and they
all also faced recurrent debts and other economic problems arising from their low salaries or per-
iodic unemployment.
Focusing on apparently extraordinary events that occurred in Tajikistan in 2010, this article
examines a ﬂood that hit the Kulob region, and a government-led campaign of forced taxation
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which aimed to collect funds from Tajikistan’s residents in order to ﬁnish the construction of a
dam and hydropower station in Roghun, on the Vakhksh River. I analyse the ongoing effects
that the ﬂood and the campaign, both locally referred to as ‘disasters’ ( fojia), had on the everyday
lives of numerous Tajikistan residents. The ongoing effects of such disastrous events overlapped
with pre-existing constant electric blackouts and shortages of water that meant that many women
and children had to fetch water from far from home, or procure wood to cook on ﬁres in outdoor
kitchens. Constant debt and chronic illnesses, combined with a lack of sustainable sources of
income and affordable medical care, were also cited by my informants as disasters that were
not eventful but rather constant aspects of people’s daily lives. Therefore, I call the ongoing
effects of the ﬂood and the campaign to build Roghun ‘everyday disasters’. Rather than
drawing a clear boundary between mundane daily life and unexpected/catastrophic events, my
acquaintances in southern Tajikistan often told me that there were so many disasters overlapping
their daily routines that the general context in which their lives evolve was experienced as stagna-
tion (kasodí). Kasodí thus implied that the current circumstances of life in Kulob remained
stationary: everyday life could not become worse than the disastrous form it already had, but it
could not get better either.
Kasodí was described by my informants as happening more acutely in Kulob than ‘in other
places’, such as Moscow or Dushanbe, where, according to them, there existed the possibility
that people’s lives would improve. Stagnation was also interpreted as evolving from structural
problems such as a shortage of well-paid jobs, campaigns of forced taxation, or the failed devel-
opment projects of both government ministries and NGOs operating in Kulob (e.g. futile govern-
ment programmes that were launched to improve medical care, or NGO projects designed to
improve the access of local populations to clean water). Importantly, however, and related to
the question of why stagnation was perceived as a more pronounced feature of life in Kulob
than elsewhere, kasodí was also seen as a product of Kulob residents’ proclivity to acts of
cunning/cheating (cholok). Cunning/cheating, as I examine in more detail below, was practiced
by Kulob residents when they thoughtlessly sought to take advantage of the assistance, aid and
charity offered by governmental, religious or international development institutions. Therefore,
cunning/cheating was paradoxically implicated in producing stagnation, as well as being a way
of dealing with stagnation. Throughout this article, I use the term ‘non-development’ as an
analytical tool to examine the consequences of the more clearly eventful nature of the ﬂood
and the campaign to build the Roghun dam and hydropower station, and kasodí to convey the
enduring experiences of stagnation among Kulob residents.
I will analyse ﬁrstly the ways in which disasters were not seen by the people whom I came to
know in Kulob as a risk or a danger that could be avoided, administered or mitigated against. In
place of such constructions of risk and danger, I argue for a more complex notion of disasters’
relation to the speciﬁc circumstances in which everyday life evolves. In my informants’ case,
they have come to assume that stagnation, rather than improvement in their general well-being,
is the norm; I refer to this process as ‘the normalcy of non-development’. Secondly, I examine
the importance that people in southern Tajikistan place on the capacity to endure (toba
owardan) and to circumnavigate catastrophic events towards a more mundane and less tragic
dimension of their everyday lives by tackling ziq (a feeling described in southern Tajikistan as
world-weariness, sadness, and frustration) both individually and communally, for the sake of cul-
tivating a socially pleasing and sophisticated daily life. I will focus here speciﬁcally on forms of
joking (shŭkhí kardan) and cunning/cheating that, according to my informants, keep people alive
in times of stagnation, trouble and suffering. In this sense, my argument builds upon what
Robbins (2013, 457) refers to as ‘an anthropology of the good’. For Robbins this project aims
to explore ‘how people living in different societies strive to create good in their lives’ even if
such lives are characterized by suffering in the face of diverse forms of violence and deprivation.3
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I will conclude by suggesting that joking and cunning/cheating are aspects of my informants’
lives of fundamental importance to understand how they do not simply cope with misfortune
but deal with the normalcy of non-development and everyday disasters in creative, lively and
morally informed ways. A recognition of these aspects of their daily lives reveals Kulob residents
as not the passive victims of ‘natural’ and socio-economic disasters but agents endowed with the
‘means’ to strive for a life worth living.
Turning a disastrous event into an ordinary routine
In her study of the affective dimensions of everyday life, Kathleen Stewart (2007) suggests that
everyday life consists of complex rhythms of ‘ﬂow and arrest’. The ﬂow of everydayness, or ‘the
still’, is interrupted by ordinary events that, nevertheless, disrupt the quietness of this ﬂow: ‘a still
life pops out of the ordinary’ (21). But what counts as an event? In his study of the moral worlds of
Moscovites, Zigon (2007) suggests that events are best understood as a form of moral and ethical
breakdown. He argues that people live in a comfortable, unreﬂective and rather embodied mode
of everyday life, which is, however, often interrupted by ethical moments, or ‘moments that shake
one out of the everydayness of being moral’ (133). Hoffman and Lubkemann (2005), in their
study of ‘warscapes’ in Africa, remark that the boundaries delineating normal everyday life
and what counts as an event are problematic. In many contexts, perhaps especially in such ‘wars-
capes’, which these authors deﬁne as places where violent events and instability have ‘become the
norm’ (318), the distinction between the event and the everyday is difﬁcult to clearly deﬁne (see
also Das 2007 and Trentmann 2009). My ethnographic examples suggest that, similarly to
Zigon’s informants, Kulob residents do attempt to return to something they consider to be normal-
ity, and to navigate the event, in many cases disastrous events, towards ordinariness. However, an
event is a transforming force that ‘shakes’ (Hoffman and Lubkemann 2005), if not fully ‘erodes’
(Badiou 2005; Humphrey 2008) existing knowledge: therefore, the everydayness to which Kulob
residents attempt to return is also constantly shifting.
Building on these approaches to the study of the event’s relationship to the everyday, I am
concerned with the ways in which ordinary life is crafted out of events, and the extent to
which the texture of the ‘ordinary’ in such circumstances also exhibits a changing quality.
How are these processes accounted for in contexts where a disaster is not a singular event but
instead is conceived as ‘an ongoing experience’ and a ‘result of slow processes of deterioration,
erosion and negative change’ (Vigh 2008, 8–9)? For many of my informants in Kulob disastrous
events (such as ﬂoods and campaigns of forced taxation) as well as the expectation of non-devel-
opment (in the form, for example, of constant electricity blackouts, deﬁcient sources of income, or
the absence of resources to treat a life-threatening illness) have become the norm and are experi-
enced as unending stagnation. I suggest that by exploring the speciﬁcities of what is considered a
‘disaster’ ( fojia) by people in Kulob it is possible to examine the blurred boundaries between
extraordinary events and everydayness; to analyse the general sense of stagnation among
Kulob residents, and to account for joking and cunning/cheating as some of the most highly
valued forms through which people in Kulob attempt to transform catastrophe into more
mundane aspects of their everyday lives.
Much of the literature on disasters focuses on how environment, society and technology inter-
play in complicated ways to produce hazards, danger zones and ﬁnally events that, because of
their destructive impact on human societies, are called disasters (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman
1999). Another strand of the literature deals with disaster risk management and resilience, or
the capacity of socio-ecological systems to absorb shocks through preventive measures to
avoid, minimize and cope with disaster impacts (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013). However, as
Béné et al. (2012, 12) point out, ‘in much of the debate on resilience and social-ecological
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systems, the agency of people is often veiled, focusing instead on the ability of the “system” to
recover from shocks’. Therefore, my approach to analysing the ﬂood in Kulob, as well as the cam-
paign to gather funds for the Roghun dam and hydropower station, begins with a different set of
theories that critically engage with the social construction of notions of risk. Beck (1992) and
Giddens (1991) point out that ‘risk’ is a calculative discourse in ‘modern’ societies that has
been incorporated into everyday life through attitudes towards consumption, work and health,
in order to avoid potentially adverse scenarios. In this calculative framework for analysing disas-
ters, such events are depicted as emerging from natural forces and departing ‘from a state of nor-
malcy to which a society returns to on recovery’ (Bankoff 2003, 11). Risk and catastrophic events,
furthermore, are expected to be managed through technocratic and bureaucratic means in order to
avoid, reduce and repair the potential damage to human societies. Conversely, in many countries
such as Tajikistan the capacities of the government to avoid damage are insufﬁcient, or, as
Simpson (2013) suggests in his analysis of the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, these capacities are
captured by private companies and investors that aim to realize proﬁts from projects of preven-
tion, relief and reconstruction.
In his anthropological and historical study of disasters in the Philippines, Bankoff (2003)
suggests that people’s constant exposure to disastrous events has led to the normalization of
threat. Vigh (2008), in his work on Guinea-Bissau, refers to this type of scenario as ‘crisis as
context’, or places where crisis has become the norm: notions of hazard, vulnerability and disaster
are, therefore, discursively constructed and culturally disparate in different societies. Vigh warns
us, however, that although crisis ‘may become normal’ because of people’s constant exposure to
extreme adversities, his informants in Bissau do not remain passive or indifferent to their troubles
(11). Instead, Vigh’s acquaintances ﬁnd ‘terrains of action’ to improve the harsh conditions in
which their everyday lives evolve. In other words, as Jackson (2011, ix) suggests in a discussion
of the concept of ‘well-being’, the process of normalizing the occurrence of disasters is ‘a ﬁeld of
struggle’ rather than a ‘settled state’. Building on the work of these authors, I suggest that Kulob
residents do not see disastrous events and stagnation as ruptures, risks or circumstances that they
can prevent and administer. Instead, disasters are often referred to by Kulob residents as ‘normal’.
These events are expected to be endured without great complaint, and thus be quickly incorpor-
ated into less tragic dimensions of their everyday lives, a process to which creative forms of
joking and cunning/cheating are of considerable importance.
The Roghun hydropower station, shortages, debt and other everyday disasters
‘We do not have gas, electricity, [running] water, money or a job – but we have fresh air and clean
water!’ This was one of the phrases most commonly repeated to me during my stay in Kulob,
often in a tone that mixed joking, pride, and desperation. Tajikistan, the so-called ‘water
country’, lacks energy resources, such as oil and gas, that neighbouring countries in Central
Asia (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) possess.4 Therefore, people throughout the
country, including those in the Kulob region, are subjected to daily and seasonal rationing of
gas (in the very few areas of the country where it is available), electricity and pumped water.
The politics of the provision of utilities was a matter of everyday life, and underpinned
people’s routines, especially when they struggled to secure water and to take advantage of the
available hours of electricity to fulﬁl their daily domestic tasks.
In 2010 especially, water was evoked by Tajikistan’s government as ‘the body of the nation’
(Suyarkulova 2014, 376) and the resource that would guarantee Tajikistan’s development. Water
would transform the country into a ‘progressive’ nation with a permanent supply of water and
electricity to every house and workplace. As Suyarkulova and Féaux de la Croix (forthcoming)
suggest, projects concerning energy and hydropower infrastructure were already at the core of the
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previous Soviet government. Soviet ofﬁcials treated such engineering projects as a form of sym-
bolic power that celebrated the conquest of nature by collective human labour, and thus an impor-
tant step on the road to progress and modernization. The Soviet ‘hydraulic mission’ in Central
Asia aimed to increase irrigation for cotton production, as well as generate affordable hydro-
energy. It was according to this logic that Tajikistan’s president publicly announced that it was
necessary to construct a gigantic dam and hydropower station (HPS) in Roghun.5
A Roghun HPS on the Vakhsh River was ﬁrst proposed by the Soviet regime in 1956, but only
started to take shape in 1976, when Soviet engineers intended Roghun to be the highest dam in the
world (335 m). However, the dam was never ﬁnished, due to a lack of funds, and was abandoned
in the late 1970s despite the already relatively advanced state of works that had been undertaken
there.6 Prior to 2008, the year in which the Tajik government reactivated the project, Tajikistan
had already searched for international partners, principally Russia, to assist with the ﬁnal com-
pletion of the dam. However, several Russian investors declined the offer of further involvement
in Roghun, since according to the terms of their participation they would not be permitted to hold
the majority of shares. According to Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda (an inﬂuential former leader of Taji-
kistan’s Islamic Opposition in the civil war), Pakistan was also interested in investing in the
Roghun HPS as early as 1992, yet this plan was opposed by both Russia and Uzbekistan. Accord-
ing to Turajonzoda, the possible involvement of Pakistan in the project and the increasing Pakis-
tani presence and inﬂuence in Tajikistan was one of the reasons behind the onset of civil war in
1992 (Canﬁeld and Rasuly-Paleczek 2010). In 1993, the remaining foundations for the dam were
destroyed by a ﬂood.
Short of both investors and funds, in 2010 Rahmon launched a large-scale campaign across
the country that, as I explore below, theoretically invited (but in practice compelled) most of Taji-
kistan’s population to buy stock (sahmiaho) and thus to invest in the project. In exchange for
investing in the construction of the dam, the buyers were issued certiﬁcates for their stock in quan-
tities of TJS 100, 200 and 500 (equivalent to USD 21, 42 and 105). The ofﬁcial media played an
important role in the campaign to raise funds for the Roghun HPS. The authorizing discourse of
the campaign was based on depictions of Tajikistan’s present as unsustainable because its existing
hydropower stations are insufﬁcient for the country’s present energy needs; therefore Tajikistan’s
people suffer daily and seasonal electricity rationing and constant blackouts. Images of the build-
ing site in Roghun, decorated with the national ﬂag, the words ‘nation’ and ‘motherland’, and the
serious and resolute face of the president beneath a helmet were commonly displayed, not just on
television but also on advertising hoardings across the country.7 Rahmon argued that the Roghun
HPS was vital to Tajikistan’s strivings to become self-sufﬁcient in energy terms. He even conjec-
tured that, in the future, Roghun would make the country an exporter of electricity; the proﬁts
would bring astounding prosperity to the nation.
The economic impacts of the campaign, however, were felt by many individuals and families
for several years. At the time of my research, the average pension and monthly salary in Kulob
ranged from TJS 70 to 120 (USD 14.70 to 25.20). Aka Daler was a man in his sixties who was
about to retire from his ‘well-paid’ job in the local council. Aka Daler’s monthly income was TJS
300 TJS (USD 64), and although he was the only person earning an income in his family, he was
‘invited’ by state ofﬁcials, or as Aka Daler himself put it, ‘compelled’ (majbur), to buy TJS 4000
(USD 840.60) in stock. The full impact of this ﬁnancial outlay on the well-being of Aka Daler’s
family is more clearly recognized when considered in relation to his annual salary of TJS 3600
(USD 756.50). Aka Daler had to take a high-interest loan from a national bank to pay for the
stock, and he remained in debt for more than two years as a direct result of the campaign to
build Roghun. Furthermore, it delayed his plans of becoming a pensioner. All of Aka Daler’s
work colleagues (hamkorho) faced the same or similar conditions: if they did not buy stock,
6 D. Ibañez-Tirado
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their superiors told them, they would lose their job. Another worker, also employed in a relatively
stable job in a respectable government ofﬁce, made the following remarks to me:
We were told that if we want to have Tajikistan with electricity and running water in the future, and
working industries and productive factories for our children, we have to make an effort to buy that
stock. I agree. We have to do something good for our country. We cannot live eternally on remittances
and our youngsters cannot live eternally in Russia.
Although the majority of the working people with whom I spoke shared this man’s point of
view, they also argued that the price of the stock, the pressure that the government placed on
people to buy it, and their general degree of impoverishment did not logically meld with the
Roghun HPS project.
In a comparative analysis of building dams and roads in Jimma, Ethiopia, Mains (2012)
argues that it is through these projects that his informants keep believing in ‘progressive narratives
and a developmentalist state’ even though in many cases such projects are never completed. Simi-
larly, Kulob residents, especially students in college and university, expressed to me a feeling of
being enchanted by the future realization of the dam, or, as Ferguson (1999) puts it, by the ‘expec-
tations of modernity’. However, the great majority of my informants, including such youngsters,
were less enthusiastic than people in Jimma appear to have been about donating their money to the
Roghun cause. In contrast to youngsters in Jimma, Kulob residents were not given jobs by the
companies in charge of building Roghun. Actually, most Tajik citizens and non-approved local
and foreign journalists were banned from the Roghun region and the speciﬁc building site; my
informants told me that although the campaign to gather money was national and public, the
details of the whole project were a well-kept ‘secret’ (mahfí; Rus. taína).8
The pervasive secrecy also applied to information about how personal liabilities were calcu-
lated and by whom, as well as the actual rules about how many shares an individual should buy
and how many times the campaign would be repeated. Seemingly, the shares that workers had to
buy correlated to their salaries, but in some workplaces (e.g. universities and schools) students
were compelled by their teachers to buy stock to cover the stock of the academic and administra-
tive staff. I also heard reports of nurses and doctors who in addition to the expected fees for their
services gave medical attention in exchange for stock. Superiors in each company or workplace
were in charge of checking the acquisition of stock by their subordinates, and to report such stock
to their superiors. The general means of coercion to force people to buy stock was the threat of
losing their jobs, or in the case of independent entrepreneurs, the closure by state ofﬁcials of their
company, shop, or business. Each of the shopkeepers in the bazaar was ‘asked’ to buy between
TJS 200 and 1000 in stock (between USD 42 and 210). Doing so, ofﬁcials told them, would
ensure that their shop remained open. Students were told by their teachers that if they did not
buy stock they would not be able to sit their exams, or would be refused enrolment in the follow-
ing academic year. A woman explained to me that, in this way, teachers ‘did cunning’:
My son, only eight years old, was requested TJS 10 for stock. He will not receive a certiﬁcate, though,
because the money is actually for his teacher to buy her own stock. How will my husband manage to
buy his own stock, requested by the cotton factory, and then our children’s stock for the teacher?
In Kulob, as in the rest of the country, many workers (korgar) acquired bank loans (qarz) and
requested urgent remittances from their relatives working in Russia to help pay for the stock.
Some people I spoke to, who largely worked in factories (e.g. Kulob’s milk factory) and compa-
nies (e.g. mobile phone companies), told me that a proportion of their monthly salary was being
deducted to pay for stock, in addition to the loans taken from banks and relatives.
During the campaign to gather funds for Roghun, the economic challenges posed by the con-
struction of such a colossal venture, the levels of indebtedness that Tajikistan’s people faced as a
result, and the potential failure of the project were entirely absent from ofﬁcial discourses.9
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However, Tajikistan’s government emphasized that if Tajikistan did not become energy self-suf-
ﬁcient, then neighbouring countries would soon begin to take advantage of its vulnerability.
Indeed, according to such politicians, Tajikistan’s greatest foe, Uzbekistan, was already acting
in such a manner. As the Roghun project was being launched, the Uzbek government placed
pressure on Tajikistan to stop building the dam. They argued that by blocking the Vakhsh
River, which ﬂows through Uzbekistan to the Aral Sea, Tajikistan was almost certain to
damage the environment, desiccate important Uzbek agricultural lands, and therefore threaten
the ‘security’ of Uzbekistan’s people.10 Strong measures were taken by Uzbekistan against Taji-
kistan: Uzbek air space was closed to Tajik aircraft, and the borders through which many basic
imported goods (including ﬂour, rice, medicines and cooking oils) arrived in Tajikistan from
both Uzbekistan and beyond were sealed to commercial trafﬁc.11 As a direct consequence,
prices for petrol (and transport) and basic food products increased in Tajikistan: petrol prices,
for example, rose by 40% during the political crisis, eventually reaching TJS 6 (USD 1.20)
per litre.
In these difﬁcult economic and political conditions, many of my Kulobi informants remarked
to me that they felt ‘inspired’ by their love for the motherland (vatan) and the bright future that
Roghun offered Tajikistan. Yet, most of my acquaintances were more concerned with their daily
struggle to gather the money to pay for the stock, which people I knew did by cutting back on
already insufﬁcient household expenditures. In Kulob, this period of ﬂuctuating prices for
basic goods was characterized by a reduction in wedding celebrations (tŭího) – the major and
most valued form of entertainment and sociality in the region. In those days, many of my infor-
mants also told me that they believed that the project would never be completed and the money
they had ‘invested’ in the stock would never be returned to them. In addition, all of this economic
uncertainty coincided with the ﬂoodwaters that hit and devastated Charamgharo. My informants
often explained to me that the reason the ﬂood that hit Kulob should not be called a disaster ( fojia)
was because there were many such events, but that, most importantly, ‘The whole situation is a
disaster.’
The camp: a spatial model of the blurred boundaries between the disastrous event and
everyday life
Three days after the ﬂood, and as the campaign to collect funds for the Roghun HPS continued, an
area for those affected by the ﬂood was erected by a variety of organizations in Kulob’s stadium,
chosen because of its location on higher ground. Tents marked with the symbols of the Red Cross,
Oxfam and the UN mushroomed quickly within the stadium. People in areas not directly affected
by the ﬂood but whose homes lay near the camp told me that this was the correct procedure to help
those in the camp who were left homeless. As days passed, however, my acquaintances from these
parts of Kulob began to complain that some of the victims they knew had started to ‘do cunning’
and to ‘invite’ their relatives to live in the tents with them. People in the camp had running water,
free food (including ‘eggs and milk on a daily basis’, a standard of nutrition that was seen by
many as a luxury), access to instant medical services, free medicines and vaccinations, and
even a nursery for their children – the last being an unheard-of marker of opulence that the
vast majority of families in Kulob could never afford. On seeing the facilities offered to the
camp-dwellers, many concluded that life in the camp was of a higher standard than that
outside it: basic services on the outside, they said, were next to nonexistent.
Furthermore, in the unaffected neighbourhoods the everyday shortages of water and electri-
city I discussed above were being experienced more frequently than before the ﬂood; many
pipes and cables had been damaged or destroyed by the ﬂoodwaters. Those living inside the
camp, however, complained that their situation was in fact no better than ordinary life; many
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sat inside their tents and lamented the loss of their relatives, their crops or/and animals, and their
houses. Soon afterwards, Tajikistan’s president visited the city of Kulob and announced that all
victims of the ﬂood in the region would receive a brand-new house for free (bepul).
On a daily basis, however, receiving government and international aid was interpreted by
many as something that dehumanized those affected by the ﬂood, in the sense that they were
fed, enumerated, ordered, registered, watched, rushed and patrolled within the camp by nurses,
doctors, police ofﬁcers and all kind of volunteers. The lack of privacy engendered by this
routine became a daily concern for the victims in the stadium. Several people remarked to me,
however, that experiencing such forms of surveillance was not such an abnormal aspect of life
for them. They said that the movements of all Tajik citizens, with or without a ﬂood or camp,
were closely watched and recorded by state ofﬁcials, on the grounds that doing so kept peace
and stability in the country (Heathershaw 2009). At the same time, those outside the camp repeat-
edly told me that the situation inside the camp was better because those affected by the ﬂood were
entitled to donations from NGOs and the gifts of aid and support. After expressing these concerns,
I heard on many occasions the phrase, ‘We became like animals!’ This phrase pointed at the para-
doxes of people being fed and looked after, yet also being carefully observed and patrolled by
NGO workers and state ofﬁcials. It was uttered both by those in the tent-camp and those living
outside it: the boundaries between what constituted disaster/camp and normalcy/outside-the-
camp were far from being straightforward.
Normalizing the disaster: joking and cunning/cheating as involvement
In addition to the debates about the quality of life within and outside the camp, the ways in which
many Kulob residents thought about the ﬂood evoked the type of general attitudes they held about
everyday life: as a friend of mine told me, life was full of suffering (azob), but there was also
plenty of time for jolly talking (chak-chak kardan). One of my closest friends in Kulob,
Shirin, was a young mother of three children who suffered a painful and life-threatening
illness. In addition to all her misfortunes, Shirin’s cows and chickens had drowned in the ﬂood
waters. On the days following the ﬂood, people called her ‘poor you’ (bechora, lit. ‘without
means’). Emphasizing her agency and resourcefulness, Shirin responded to such people: ‘No!
[Do not call me] “poor you” [be-chora, ‘without-means’]. We have means! [chora dorem]!’
While many in Kulob spoke about the ways in which both their everyday life and experiences
in the camp were ‘full’ of suffering and stagnation, projects of non-development and everyday
disasters, Shirin, as well as many others of my friends and informants, were also reluctant to
have their personal and collective situation described in one-dimensionally pessimistic terms;
indeed, they would often emphasize the high levels of resourcefulness, patience and endurance
that Kulob residents demonstrated as they dealt with the recurrent situations they faced. By
emphasizing that they had means (chora) they also tended to highlight their creativity and wit
when dealing with misfortune, and the necessity of being recognized and valued as agentive in
the processes affecting their lives.
Despite the loss of human lives, houses and cattle, people living inside the camp rapidly began
to reorganize their ‘normal’ daily activities, such as visiting each other, chatting, jolly talking,
sharing experiences of suffering, and, importantly, also joking and cunning/cheating. Joking, I
found out during my ﬁeldwork, is one of the most important ways in which people in southern
Tajikistan socialize and also deal with misfortune. As the work of Goldstein (2003) on favelas
in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates, laughing is not only about hilarity or escape but also about dis-
playing resilience and dignity in the face of poverty and hopelessness. Building on Goldstein I
suggest that joking and cholok (cunning/cheating) were modes through which Kulob residents
‘normalized’ disastrous events, or, as Das (2007) puts it, a way in which the ‘big’ events
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entered into the realm of the ordinary. Moreover, joking and cunning/cheating also constituted
means through which Kulob residents sought to acknowledge their involvement in shaping the
conditions of their daily lives. In order to understand the importance of such collective self-reﬂec-
tion, I borrow the term ‘involvement’ from Anderson’s (2013) discussion of everyday narratives
that lament or scorn the self among entrepreneurs in Aleppo, Syria. Involvement occurs when the
narrator directs ridicule not simply at others but also at the self in order to both criticize adverse
circumstances and acknowledge his or her own involvement in such scenarios. Being involved is
moving beyond being acknowledged as a powerless victim or as located in a social sphere sep-
arated from the state. Rather, involvement implies that narrators are ‘critical and complicit’, and
are agents who put themselves on display to laugh and be laughed at. Involvement is signiﬁcant,
Anderson suggests, because ‘it becomes a way of sustaining political life and possibility under
authoritarianism or any hegemonic structure’ (476).
In Kulob, many of my informants, including some of those who expressed feelings of
sadness and world-weariness (ziq) and said they had been destroyed (vaíron) by the ﬂood,
could be found from time to time laughing at events and turns of phrase that they found humor-
ous and that had been uttered by people in a similar situation to their own. For example, shortly
after the ﬂood had destroyed her house, I sat with a woman who was crying in her tent, which
was in the camp. Soon afterwards, her relatives arrived to visit and comfort her. She sobbed: ‘I
lost all my teeth! The water took them away! What a disgrace!’ The other women worried:
‘How? Did a rock hit you? Are you bleeding?’ The woman stopped crying and began laughing
loudly: ‘No! I kept my gold teeth in a little box. The water took them away! Can you imagine
how many teeth and how much gold were lost with the ﬂood?’ The story made the women roar
with laughter, especially because some of them had entertained the idea of imitating their
‘greedy’ (khasis) neighbours in their endeavours of searching for gold in the ﬂooded courtyards
of other people’s houses. One of these women eventually recognized her involvement: in such a
context of misfortune and tragedy, and knowing that corpses of animals and people were still
being recovered from the stinking mud, she had gone, with her husband, searching for ‘treas-
ures’ (gems, gold, documents), and had found none. These women then laughed even louder
until, with tears in their eyes, one of them told me: ‘I swear to God! Here we laugh a lot
about some stories. We laugh, and then we cry.’ Indeed, people in the camp could be found
joking and laughing, and minutes afterwards sobbing, as they narrated the tragedies the
ﬂood had brought about. Yet, as in the ordinary life of Kulob and the forms of sociality that
are important to it, joking in the tents became popular as a daily strategy to cheer oneself
and others up and render dramatic misfortune, an unexpected event, into a normal and
worthy everyday life.
The other way in which people in Kulob tended to deal with misfortune, to navigate disastrous
events towards everydayness and to acknowledge their involvement in experiences of stagnation
was ‘cheating’ or ‘cunning’ – actions described to me as cholok, zirak and ﬁreb kardan, all terms
that might refer to astuteness or cheating, or a mixture of both.
A builder who volunteered to distribute aid to those affected by the ﬂood bitterly complained
to me that:
There are people who were not affected and are not suffering any loss. Nevertheless, they take lots of
the parcels of aid. One day I saw one of them and told him: ‘You are not afraid of God! I swear to God
that I saw your house and not even a drop of water entered it!’ But people who are cholok and want to
take advantage of the situation just do it.
Another man, who had worked as a volunteer during the height of the ‘disaster’, told me that
people in Tajikistan were ‘cheaters’ (Rus. moshenniki) and that it was not difﬁcult to realize that
everybody, including him, wanted to cheat the government, the ‘uncles’ (patrons) and whomever
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else could be cheated in order to take advantage of this situation and many others that they faced
on a daily basis. He illustrated his point with this story:
People cheat! We went to deliver aid from my local mosque to the [affected] neighbourhood. One
young man requested two parcels of aid from us, so he could deliver one to his father, who lived
next door but who was not present at that moment. Later on his father arrived and angrily told us:
‘Why did you give my parcel to my son? The bastard will never give it to me!’ You see? People
cheat even their own father.
These stories demonstrate that people think everyday social relations are fully implicated in
the context of disaster: networks of trust and kinship are seen not only as a source of support to be
called upon in times of good and bad but also as potential founts of danger. It is important to
emphasize here that my argument is not that Kulob residents or government ofﬁcials are ‘liars’
or ‘cheaters’ but that this is an ironic self-recognition similar to what Hertzfeld (2004) calls ‘cul-
tural intimacy’ and deﬁnes as ‘those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of
external embarrassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of common
sociality’ (3).
In addition, these stories reveal aspects of people’s agency, wit and creativity in dealing with
disasters and the normalcy of non-development in Tajikistan, a state that is characterized by a
narrow elite who hold overwhelming political and economic power and who are also currently
seeking, with considerable success, to control a vast range of the country’s resources, as well
as to order, discipline and determine the forms of knowledge that are publicly acceptable. Rasa-
nayagam, Beyer, and Reeves (2014, 11) advance the question of ‘How is the state being done’ in
Central Asia, and highlight the importance of ‘contingency, ambiguity and indeterminacy’ as well
as the capacity of reﬂection of those involved in performing politics in the region. By acknowl-
edging that the experience of kasodí or stagnation and the actual normalcy of non-development
are also manifested as cunning/cheating, and that Kulob residents as narrators are involved in such
practices, I suggest that my informants in Kulob are bringing these topics to ‘public discussion’ in
a manner that enacts ‘involvement’ and demands ‘witnessing’, regardless of the fact that their
involvement can be evaluated as greedy or helpless practices that replicate ‘economic and politi-
cal marginalisation’ (Anderson 2013, 477).
The evaluations of good and bad forms of cunning are made by Kulob residents in terms of
empathy towards others, piety and religion, and also in more pragmatic ways: cunning/cheating is
regarded, given the circumstances of daily life, as being, at times, a morally neutral way of achiev-
ing goals. The campaigns of forced taxation to invest in the Roghun HPS or to build the promised
new houses for those affected by the ﬂood in Kulob (as I will discuss below) were also seen as
‘cunning’ by many of my informants, insofar as they were convinced that some of the ‘donated’
money would end up in the pockets of corrupt ofﬁcials. However, this cunning/cheating was
reﬂected not only in the mischievousness ( fasod) of the government’s ofﬁcials but also in the
ways in which ‘everybody’ (hama), as they put it, is part of a society where cunning/cheating,
even towards one’s own father, is one of the ways people deal with everyday disasters and mis-
fortune whilst attempting to be recognized as social and moral persons who are ‘not simply
oppressed by circumstances, but tainted or changed by them’ (Anderson 2013, 477). In this
sense, cunning/cheating was also evaluated as an aspect that perpetuated experiences of kasodí
or stagnation. Many people in Kulob were aware that the distinction between an appropriating
elite and a class of marginalized subalterns did little to illuminate the complexity of their daily
struggles. After all, in these stories, the victims of cunning/cheating include one’s own father,
a government that pretends to provide aid parcels and worthy ‘free’ houses for those affected
by the ﬂood, and the ‘astute’ people who were not affected by the ﬂood yet who attempted by
all means available to them to take one of the aid parcels or even one of the promised new
houses, and by doing so, cheat the government.
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Kulob’s reconstruction and the future of Roghun: disaster as context
In other areas of Tajikistan people experienced the pressure of having ‘to help Kulob’ after the
ﬂood. The so-called ordinary people (who never appeared publicly as ‘donors’) were also
‘requested’ (compelled) to bring money to their local councils to help build the promised new
houses for those affected by the ﬂood. Newspapers reported that government ofﬁcials were
busy collecting these ‘donations’, but at the same time, the governor (rais) of one of Khatlon’s
districts told me that the money to build these new houses was forcibly taken, in the form of
‘charity’ or ‘voluntary aid’, from private companies, banks, governmental ofﬁces and ministers.
The money taken from institutions such as these was then deducted directly in many cases
(though not in all) from the wages of the workers; and this deduction was in addition to the
one taken for the Roghun HPS. In this respect, the frequent ‘donations’ became to be seen by
the great majority of people to whom I spoke in Tajikistan as everyday disasters and as a
direct cause of their non-development, rather than as an investment in projects that would
assure Tajikistan’s progress and simultaneously some improvement in their general well-being.
By the end of 2010, the delays that the Roghun project had encountered added to the general
sense of kasodí or stagnation among my informants in Kulob. The dam will not be ﬁnished unless
an international techno-economic assessment requested by the IMF and the World Bank brings
positive results. This was supposed to be completed in 2013, but its completion has been
delayed. Meanwhile, the money gathered in the campaign apparently remains in a Tajik bank con-
trolled by the government. In January 2013 and in August 2015, people in Kulob told me that they
had been informed that the Roghun HPS was in the process of being built – this time with Russian
companies as major investors and stakeholders.12 However, when I asked them what had hap-
pened to their stock, they replied that it was ‘useless’ (befoida) and that all the people in Tajikistan
who invested in the project have been cheated. Some of my friends even gave me up to USD 400
of their printed shares as ‘souvenirs’, describing them, in an ironic tone, as useless ‘rubbish’. The
previous statement, that Tajikistan was not self-sufﬁcient in energy terms, was also contested by
many of my acquaintances. Some of my informants told me that, as far as they knew, Tajikistan
was already exporting electricity to China and Afghanistan. While still laughing at a joke concern-
ing blackouts, one of my informants told me: ‘We sit in the dark, while they export electricity to
Afghanistan.’Although the Roghun HPS has not been completed, Tajikistan began to export elec-
tricity to Afghanistan in 2011 from the Sangtuda HPS on the Vakhsh River.13
Conclusion
In this article, I have sought to advance the notion of ‘everyday disasters’ to explain ﬁrstly, the
imprecise boundaries between catastrophic events and daily lives as reported by Kulob residents;
and secondly, the ways these events’ negative effects were experienced by them as a form of stag-
nation. Instead of assuming the Roghun HPS or Kulob’s reconstruction as projects that would
assure Tajikistan’s development or an improvement in people’s well-being, the ﬂood, the cam-
paigns of forced taxation and the constant exposure to ‘everyday disasters’ were seen by
Kulob residents as direct causes of non-development of life in their hometown.
From this point of view, ‘everyday disasters’ are seen as buttressed not only by so-called
natural disasters but also, as Farmer (2005) puts it, by a combination of social, political and insti-
tutional arrangements that cause injury to individuals and societies, or the structural violence in
which my informants’ daily lives are encompassed. In theory, policies of social development
focus on improving the well-being of every individual in society, so they are treated with
dignity and justice, with the aim of facilitating their full potential as citizens and human
beings. My informants in southern Tajikistan explained to me that they expected the contrary:
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non-development amid structural violence. They conveyed to me a common sense of stagnation
in the already deprived conditions surrounding their everyday lives.
I have also sought to demonstrate the importance that Kulob residents place on joking and
cunning/cheating as means to endure and circumnavigate disastrous events towards everydayness
even if cunning/cheating is, at times, evaluated as a factor replicating experiences of stagnation. The
everydayness to which they aim to return has also been transformed by the occurrence of disasters
such as ﬂoods and constant campaigns of forced taxation, yet, through displaying humour and wit,
Kulob residents attempt to be recognized and valued, and to create a dimension of individual and
communal routines that are less hectic and painful, and thus to render daily life more pleasant. Fur-
thermore, joking and cunning/cheating emphasize Kulob residents’ acknowledgement of their
involvement in the disaster as the context in which their everyday lives evolve, and bring these
topics to public discussion. Thus, my informants aim to present themselves not straightforwardly
as either moral champions or amoral cheaters, pitiful victims of ﬂoods or of structural violence, or
passive objects of the state or the economic crisis that are beyond the scope of their agency.
Finally, it is important that we do not understand Kulob residents’ daily struggles as coping or
survival strategies that would simply come to an end once the tragedy has passed. Precisely
because the context of fojia or disaster is a ‘ﬁeld of struggle’ (Jackson 2011) spoken about as con-
stant, my informants put their struggles not in terms of ‘surviving’ but in terms of ‘living’ (zindagi
kardan) with whatever means (chora) they have at hand – those being a disposition towards piety,
patience and endurance, the creativity of joking, the venture of cunning/cheating, or even all these
means at the same time, regardless of the fact that cunning/cheating and embracing acts of piety
such as delivering aid to others seem to lie at opposite ends of the spectrum of moral possibilities.
Thus, although Kulob residents seemed overwhelmed by their adverse circumstances, by the
unwanted outcomes of their courses of action and by the paradoxical combination of expected
stagnation and the contingency of catastrophic events that underpinned their daily lives,
through joking and cunning they displayed their endurance and wit, which also allowed them
to create and sustain their humanity and to pursue a life worthy of being lived. After all, as my
friend Shirin often told me until her death: ‘We do have means.’
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1. In Kulob, most people communicated with me in Tajik and/or Russian. In this text, most transliterations
in brackets are in Tajik. When Russian was deployed by my informants, the abbreviation ‘Rus.’ precedes
the transliteration.
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2. The main method to gather data for this article was participant observation (2009–2013). In the aftermath
of the ﬂood, I also carried out unstructured and open-ended interviews with families affected by the ﬂood.
Some of these familieswere temporarily living in the emergency tent-camp. I also interviewed peoplewho
had not been directly affected by the ﬂood but were struggling to collect funds for the Roghun HPS.
3. Robbins (2013, 457) clariﬁes that the anthropology of the good does not seek ‘to deﬁne what universally
counts as “good”, but to explore the different ways people organize their personal and collective lives in
order to foster what they think of as good, and to study what it is like to live at least some of the time in
light of such a project’.
4. In 2010, ‘Tajikistan is a water country’ was one of the slogans used by the Tajik government to present
the country internationally. Tajikistan hosts nearly 1300 lakes, occupying 705 km².
5. Similarly to Tajikistan’s case, in her work on Kyrgyzstan, Féaux de La Croix (2011) suggests that water
and dams are two of the most powerful representations of cleanliness, modernity and progress.
6. For an analysis of technical data on major dams in Central Asia, including Roghun, seeWegerich (2011).
7. Ferry and Mandana (2008) link state-led representations and management of resources (including water
to produce electricity) to the project of building a nation-state insofar as this relation concerns notions of
sovereignty, economic and social hardship, and achievement.
8. The villages surrounding Roghun were relocated, and access to the site and the wider region was
banned, even for journalists (Ergasheva 2012; Suyarkulova 2014).
9. Some analysts consider that the construction of Roghun might ‘take over 50% of Tajikistan’s GDP’
(Marat 2010). To provide a clearer notion of how unviable the Roghun project was (not only because
it could take 50% of the country’s GDP) it is important to note that, according to Danzer and
Oleksiy (2010) and Kumo (2012), remittances constituted nearly 50% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2008.
10. For a detailed analysis of water resources in Central Asia and multilateral agreements on water allo-
cation, see Laldjebaev (2010) and Wegerich (2011).
11. For a more detailed analysis of the ways in which Central Asia is exposed to price ﬂuctuations, see Özcan
(2010). For an analysis of trade routes of basic goods to Tajikistan from abroad, see Marsden (2015).
12. For a summary of the latest assessment of the Roghun project by the World Bank (July 2014), see
Bisenov (2014).
13. Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development reported in February 2014 that the country exported 41
million kWh to Afghanistan. For more details about electricity exports from and blackouts within Taji-
kistan and Kyrgyzstan, see ‘Tajikistan exporting electricity during winter blackouts’ (2014).
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